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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The nature of the case, statement of facts and course of proceedings are
set forth in the Respondent's Brief and are incorporated herein by reference.
The state submits this Supplemental Respondent's Brief to address the Idaho
Supreme Court's holding in Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, _ , 327 P.3d 365,
367 (2014) (reh'g denied) - "that ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel is not a sufficient reason under I.C. § 19-4908 for allowing a successive
petition" - and Lopez's claim that "[t]he manner in which post-conviction counsel
neglected Mr. Lopez's case presents unique and compelling circumstances
qualifying as 'sufficient reason' under I.C. § 19-4908 to litigate claims inadequate
raised in his initial post-conviction petition in a successive petition." (Appellant's
Supp. Brief, p.3 (capitalization altered, balding omitted).)
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SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT
Alleged Ineffective Assistance Of Post-Conviction Counsel- Even If
Egregious- Is Not A "Sufficient Reason" Under I. C. § 19-4908 For Allowing
A Successive Petition
After his initial post-conviction petition was summarily dismissed, Lopez
filed a successive petition, and an affidavit in support thereof, essentially
reasserting two of the claims that were contained in his original petition.
(Compare R., pp.2-10 with #37206 R., pp.4-6.)

He also filed a "Motion For

Leave To File A Successive Petition," asserting ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel as a "sufficient reason" permitting him to relitigate the
previously dismissed claims in a successive petition. (R., pp.11-15.) The district
court ultimately dismissed Lopez's second petition as being both untimely and an
improper successive petition. (R., pp.35-43, 49-52.)
Citing Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 955 (1981), Lopez
argued in his initial appellate briefing that ineffective assistance of "counsel in an
initial post-conviction proceeding, that causes a claim to be inadequately
presented to the court, constitutes a 'sufficient reason' to allow assertion of the
same claim in a subsequent post-conviction petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908."
(Appellant's brief, p.16; see also Appellant's reply brief, pp.7-8.)

Although

Palmer was good law when Lopez cited it, the Idaho Supreme Court has since
explicitly overruled it, holding in Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, _ , 327 P.3d
365, 367-71 (2014) (reh'g denied), that, because there is no statutory or
constitutional right to counsel in a post-conviction proceeding, "ineffective
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assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a sufficient reason under I.C. § 194908 for allowing a successive petition."
Lopez acknowledges the holding of Murphy but contends the district court
erred by dismissing his successive petition because, he argues, "[t]he manner in
which post-conviction counsel neglected Mr. Lopez's case goes beyond
ineffective assistance of counsel and, instead, presents unique and compelling
circumstances that should qualify as 'sufficient reason' under I.C. § 19-4908."
(Appellant's Supp. Brief, p.3. 1) Lopez's argument fails. Lopez had no statutory
or constitutional right to counsel to pursue the claims in his post-conviction
petition. Murphy, 156 Idaho at_, 327 P.3d at 370-71. Thus, even assuming,
as Lopez suggests, that he was effectively deprived of any meaningful
representation during his initial post-conviction proceedings, such cannot
constitute a "sufficient reason" for overcoming the successive petition bar of I.C.

§ 19-4908. See id. at_, 327 P.3d at 371 ("Where there is no right to counsel,
there can be no deprivation of effective assistance of counsel," nor can a noncognizable claim of "ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel" be a "sufficient
reason" for bringing a successive petition.).
Nor does the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Eby v. State, 148 Idaho
731, 228 P.3d 998 (201 0), relied on by Lopez, mandate a different result.

1

In

Lopez's argument that this case is "unique and compelling" is apparently based
on counsel providing only an oral response to the state's motion to dismiss,
rather than a written response or a motion to amend the petition. (See
Appellant's Supp. Brief, p.2 ("The new attorney appointed for Mr. Lopez did not
amend his petition or file a written response to the State's motion. . .. [but only]
presented a very brief oral argument .... ").)
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Eby, the district court dismissed Eby's post-conviction petition for inactivity after
Eby's appointed attorneys failed to file an amended petition or otherwise do any
work on the case for more than two years.

Jsi at 732-33,

228 P.3d at 999-1000.

After learning that the petition had been dismissed, Eby, through newly
appointed counsel, sought relief from the order of dismissal pursuant to I.R.C.P.
60(b).

Jsi

at 733-34, 228 P.3d at 1000-01. On appeal from the denial of that

motion, the Idaho Supreme Court "recognize[d] and reiterate[dJ" that "there is no
right to effective assistance of counsel in post-conviction cases."
P.3d at 1004.

Jsi at 737, 228

Nevertheless, "[g]iven the unique status of a post-conviction

proceeding" as "'the exclusive means for challenging the validity of a conviction
or sentence other than by direct appeal,"' and "given the complete absence of
meaningful representation in the only available proceeding for Eby to advance
constitutional challenges to his conviction and sentence," the Eby Court
concluded

that

Eby's

"case

may present the

'unique

and

compelling

circumstances' in which I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) relief may well be warranted."

Jsi

(citations omitted).
That Eby may have been entitled to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) relief based on postconviction counsels' failures to provide him with any "meaningful representation"
does not compel the conclusion, advanced by Lopez, that "the absence of any
meaningful representation" in

an

initial post-conviction

proceeding

must

"[s]imilarly" "present sufficient reason under I.C. § 19-4908" for reasserting
already litigated claims in a successive petition. (See Appellant's Supp. Brief,
p.4.) The decision in Eby is, by its very terms, "limited in scope" and applies only
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to requests for Rule 60(b) relief in post-conviction cases. Eby, 148 Idaho at 736,
228 P.3d at 1003.

More specifically, Eby holds that where a district court

exercises its discretion to appoint post-conviction counsel but counsel does
nothing, resulting in the dismissal of the petition for inactivity, Rule 60(b)(6)
confers upon the court the discretion, in the original post-conviction case, to
determine whether appointed counsel's shortcomings constitute a unique and
compelling circumstance warranting relief from the order of dismissal. Eby, 148
Idaho at 734-38, 228 P.3d at 1001-05. Neither the reasoning nor the result of
Eby have any application where, as here, the claims in the original petition have
been finally dismissed and the petitioner asserts ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel as a basis to relitigate those claims in a successive petition.
Rather, such circumstance falls squarely under the holding of Murphy- i.e., that
"ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a sufficient reason under
I.C. § 19-4908 for allowing a successive petition." Murphy, 156 Idaho at _ ,
327 P.3d at 367.
The successive petition bar of I.C. § 19-4908 expresses a preference for
the finality of judgments.

If a post-conviction petitioner believes appointed

counsel has failed to provide any meaningful representation then, under Eby, the
time to challenge counsel's performance is in the original post-conviction action.
Murphy makes clear, however, that such claims may not be raised in a
successive post-conviction petition; otherwise, '"claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel in the immediate prior proceeding may be raised ad infinitum."'
Murphy, 156 Idaho at_, 327 P.3d at 370 (quoting Bejarano v. Warden, 929
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P.2d 922, 925 (Nev. 1996)). Because ineffective assistance of counsel is not a
"sufficient reason" for overcoming the successive petition bar of I.C. § 19-4908,
and because ineffective assistance of counsel is the only reason Lopez offered
for reasserting his original post-conviction claims in a successive petition, this
Court should uphold the district court's order of summary dismissal.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, as well as in the initial Brief of
Respondent, the state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment
entered upon the summary dismissal of Lopez's successive post-conviction
petition.
DATED this 4th day of September, 2014.
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